Look, I think that I make clear that I have no love for Putin and the voters who put him in power, and I don’t believe that Putin and his domestic supporters are right in their worldview. But they are a fact. My only standard of judgment is what is good policy for the US. And I don’t think that it is good policy for the US to antagonize Russia in support of a westernization of the Ukraine that, given their history and culture, will probably never materialize in any case.

If Putin, as I say, is bent on restoring Russian dominance of middle Europe, then this is a different matter and would require a different response. But, to my knowledge, the case is far from proven and time is on our side.

I think that there are a lot of analogies to WWI and other moments of great international misunderstanding. As I have commented before, most notably in “What to Do About Syria” (http://www.economicmanblog.com/sandbox/2013/09/07/what-to-do-about-syria/), one of the consistent mistakes that we, as Americans, make in our foreign policy dealings is to underestimate the cynicism of the rest of the world. I truly believe that America — “the shining city on a hill” — is very often well-intentioned, but we would be foolish to assume that our actions are always interpreted this way or that the entire world shares our assumptions and values. This produces a huge amount of foreign policy mistakes. By no means do I consider this an excuse for these mistakes since I firmly believe, to quote the great Milton Friedman, that “sincerity is a greatly overrated virtue.”

To come to your question, I don’t think that there is any inconsistency between the undertakings we (and Russia) previously made to Ukraine and the currently proposed course of action. The idea would be to conclude a “grand bargain” with Russia in which we would both work for a neutral Ukraine (and Georgia); after all, we committed to protect Ukraine’s independence, NOT to bring it into NATO or the EU or to promote Western values in this hopelessly corrupt country. Although the chances for striking this bargain are much reduced by the fact that the credibility of Russia and the West are now engaged, we should at least try it; this, along with some guarantees for the Russian minority, might be a sufficient political victory for Putin to call off his dogs. If, conversely, Russia persists in its aggression, then this will be evidence for the alternative interpretation of its behavior and it may call for a greater response.

Good piece. One observation and one question: for an interesting allegory, see the naval arms race pursued by Great Britain and Germany leading up to WWI. Both sides grossly misunderstood and misinterpreted the motivations of the other, with disastrous consequences. Margaret Macmillan analyzes this well in her recent book. My question is: how do the assurances Clinton gave Ukraine regarding their forfeiture of nuclear weapons in return for Western guarantees of security, misguided though they may have been, play into our responsibilities in this matter? Seems difficult to unscramble those eggs!

Best,

Tom